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Enhancing Public Health 
Surveillance for Influenza Virus 
by Incorporating Newly 
Available Rapid Diagnostic Tests
Paul V. Effler, Man-Cheng Ieong, Tammy Tom, and Michele Nakata
Beginning with the 1999-2000 influenza season, physicians throughout Hawaii ordering a viral culture for
patients with suspected influenza were also offered influenza rapid testing. We compared the number of viral
respiratory cultures sent to the Hawaii Department of Health and the number of providers who participated in
influenza surveillance over consecutive influenza seasons. The number of viral respiratory cultures rose from
396 to 2,169 between the 1998-1999 and 2000-2001 influenza seasons, and the number of providers submit-
ting >1 influenza culture increased from 34 to 327, respectively. The number of influenza isolates obtained
each season also increased (from 64 to 491). The available data suggest that the changes observed in
Hawaii’s influenza surveillance were not secondary to differences in influenza activity between seasons. This
is the first evaluation of integrating influenza rapid testing into public health surveillance. Coupling rapid tests
with cultures appears to be an effective means of improving influenza surveillance.
“The importance of surveillance to the detection and control of
emerging microbial threats cannot be overemphasized.”
Institute of Medicine (1)
he recent, highly fatal, outbreak of human illness caused
by a novel influenza A virus H5N1 in Hong Kong has dra-
matically underscored the importance of monitoring influenza
activity in the United States as a part of national preparedness
for a pandemic (2,3). Ongoing, comprehensive surveillance is
vital to addressing influenza because influenza A viruses have
the capacity to undergo abrupt shifts in the major antigenic
determinants of their surface proteins (4); these shifts can give
rise to novel influenza viruses capable of producing cata-
strophic pandemics (5). In 1918 an estimated 20 million people
died from a new influenza A H1N1 virus strain (6). Milder
influenza pandemics in 1957 and 1968 killed an estimated
90,000 people in the United States (1).
Enhancing our capacity to detect novel viruses with pan-
demic potential requires establishing comprehensive programs
to culture and subtype influenza isolates in circulation during
outbreaks and annual epidemics, in other words, virologic sur-
veillance. With this goal in mind, the Hawaii State Department
of Health (HDOH) sent letters in the fall of 1998 to all licensed
physicians in the state encouraging them to collect specimens
for viral culture when evaluating patients suspected of having
influenza. Although these cultures were offered at no cost to
the physician or patient, little increase in specimen submis-
sions was observed during the 1998-99 influenza season when
compared to prior years. Subsequent discussions with provid-
ers indicated that there was little incentive to collect viral cul-
ture specimens because culture results typically take 2 to 8
weeks to be finalized and thus are not perceived as useful for
clinical management. 
A more timely diagnosis of influenza is possible with rapid
antigen tests (7). The advent of rapid testing for influenza has
raised concern among public health professionals, however,
because of the potential of such tests to undermine virologic
surveillance. Some authorities have predicted that submissions
of specimens for viral isolation would decrease as rapid anti-
gen test kits are improved and become more widely available
(3). The rapid tests currently available cannot distinguish novel
virus subtypes from subtypes already known to be in circula-
tion. If fewer viral isolates are obtained as a consequence of
adopting point-of-care rapid tests, the result may be a reduc-
tion of our capacity for early detection of the next influenza
pandemic.
We present an evaluation of the impact of incorporating
rapid influenza testing into ongoing virologic surveillance
activities.
Methods
Standard Virologic Surveillance
The virologic influenza surveillance system in Hawaii
before the 1999-2000 influenza season consisted of physicians
submitting cultures for influenza directly to HDOH (direct
submissions). HDOH supplied the specimen collection materi-
als, transported specimens, and processed the specimens with-
out charge. There were no restrictions on the number of
specimens that could be submitted. This service had been
available for many years but was actively promoted through a
mail-out in 1998 addressed to physicians throughout the state.
Commercial clinical laboratories in Hawaii do not perform Hawaii State Department of Health, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA
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influenza viral cultures locally, and very few specimens are
forwarded from these laboratories to reference laboratories on
the U.S. mainland (the number of influenza cultures sent out of
state has not exceeded 25 specimens for any of the major labo-
ratories during each of the last four influenza seasons [F. Liu,
X. Zheng, pers. comm.]) 
Enhanced Virologic Influenza Surveillance for 1999-2000 
and 2000-01
Beginning with the 1999-2000 influenza season, and again
during the 2000-01 season, all licensed physicians in the state
were informed by mail that rapid influenza tests were available
to clinicians who also wished to order an influenza culture for
their patient. The letter recommended considering the diagno-
sis of influenza in patients with a fever >37.8°C accompanied
by a cough or sore throat. 
HDOH supplied viral specimen collection kits and rapid
test kits to four private clinical laboratories that provide service
to approximately 80% of the state’s population, at no charge to
the laboratory (8). The specimen collection kits contained two
sterile dacron swabs, one sterile polystyrene tube, one tube
containing viral transport medium (VTM Micro Test, Inc.; Lil-
burn, GA), and instructions for collection and submission of
the appropriate specimens. Participating commercial laborato-
ries were responsible for distributing these supplies to their sat-
ellite specimen collection locations (>70 distinct locations
overall). To obtain both a rapid influenza test and viral culture,
two throat or nasopharyngeal swabs were required, one placed
into the sterile polystyrene tube and the other into the tube con-
taining VTM. Specimens were transported through usual spec-
imen transport channels.
Rapid influenza tests were performed at participating com-
mercial laboratories, and the results were reported to the sub-
mitting provider and HDOH. Laboratories were not allowed to
bill for the cost of rapid test kits provided by HDOH but could
charge for performing the test per their usual practices. The
specimen in VTM was then forwarded from the commercial
laboratory to the Hawaii Public Health Virology Laboratory
(HPHVL, a World Health Organization [WHO] collaborating
virology laboratory) for culture, typing, subtyping, and anti-
genic characterization.
HDOH purchased the influenza rapid tests through a com-
petitive bid process. The primary criteria used for selecting the
BioStar FLU OIA test (Boulder, CO) was cost (<U.S.$5 for the
first 1,000 tests and <$10 for any additional tests). The test
manufacturer provided training on performing the rapid test to
HPHVL and commercial laboratory staff. 
For this report, the number and results of influenza cultures
submitted and the number of distinct providers who submitted
at least one viral culture during the 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-
2000, and 2000-01 influenza seasons were determined. The
influenza season was defined as the period beginning with
week 40 of the first year extending through week 20 of the next
year, that is, early October through mid-May. In addition, for
the 2000-01 influenza season, we calculated the positive and
negative predictive values of the FLU OIA Rapid Test as com-
pared to influenza viral culture for all specimens with complete
test results as of May 21, 2001.
Comparison Data
After observing a change in the number of viral cultures
submitted between the 1999-2000 influenza season and the
previous season, we conducted an assessment to determine if
this difference might be explained by factors other than incor-
poration of rapid tests into the surveillance effort. Data regard-
ing the number of influenza cultures performed at sites other
than Hawaii for the 1997-98, 1998-99, and 1999-2000 influ-
enza seasons were obtained from the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) for approximately 75 other WHO
collaborating virology laboratories located throughout the
United States (9). Most of the participating laboratories are
located in state or local health departments with a smaller num-
ber in universities or hospitals. During the 1999-2000 influ-
enza season, 44 of the WHO laboratories (excluding Hawaii
HPHVL) reported information for at least 25 weeks of the sea-
son; 37 (84%) of the 44 laboratories had also supplied reports
for at least 25 weeks during each of the two prior influenza sea-
sons, and these laboratories were included in our analysis. 
Data from physician offices in Hawaii participating in the
U.S. Influenza Sentinel Physician Surveillance Network
(ISPSN) were used as a measure of the relative severity of
Hawaii’s past four influenza seasons (10,11). ISPSN sites
report the total number of patient visits and the number of vis-
its for influenza-like illness on a weekly basis during the influ-
enza season. Influenza-like illness was defined as a fever of
>37.8°C accompanied by a cough or sore throat. Weeks for
which the proportion of visits for influenza-like illness
exceeded 3% were defined as having increased influenza activ-
ity (10). 
Results
The total number of specimens submitted to HPHVL for
influenza culture increased sharply during the first season that
rapid tests were introduced into influenza surveillance; this
trend continued into the 2000-01 season (Table 1). The number
of influenza isolates obtained tripled between the 1998-99 and
1999-2000 influenza seasons and then tripled again between
the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 seasons. A nearly 10-fold
increase in the number of distinct providers who submitted
influenza cultures was observed between the 1998-99 and
2000-01 influenza seasons.
A total of 1,015 (91%) and 2,101 (97%) of the culture spec-
imens received at HPHVL were processed through one of the
participating private laboratories during the 1999-2000 and
2000-01 influenza seasons, respectively; 2,979 (96%) of these
culture specimens had a rapid test performed on an accompa-
nying specimen; the remaining specimens were direct submis-
sions to HPHVL. All four of the private laboratories materially
participated in the surveillance activity; the mean number of
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with totals ranging from 188 to 333 during the 1999-2000
influenza season. 
None of 136 influenza A isolates obtained during the 1999-
2000 influenza season were subtyped at HPHVL. However,
159 (79%) of 202 influenza A isolates identified during the
2000-01 were subtyped and characterized at HPHVL; 143
were A/New Caledonia/20/99-like (H1N1), and 16 were A/
Panama/2007/99-like (H3N2).
Influenza Cultures Submitted to WHO Collaborating 
Laboratories in the United States 
A 5% increase was observed in the number of influenza
cultures submitted between the 1998-99 and 1999-2000 influ-
enza seasons for the 37 WHO comparison sites overall (Table
2). When data for each laboratory were examined individually,
Hawaii HPHVL demonstrated the largest rise in influenza cul-
tures processed between the 1998-99 and 1999-2000 seasons
(181%); the next highest increase was reported from a labora-
tory in the Mountain region, whose specimens increased from
260 to 524 (a 102% increase) between the 1998-99 and 1999-
2000 seasons (individual data for laboratories other than
Hawaii are not shown). Three other laboratories had increases
of approximately 50% over the previous influenza season, but
more than half (19 of 37) of the laboratories had fewer speci-
mens submitted in the 1999-2000 season when compared to the
previous season.
Physician Visits for Influenza-Like Illness 
The number and proportion of patients with influenza-like
illness reported from sentinel physicians in Hawaii for the past
four consecutive influenza seasons are shown in Table 3. The
percent of patient visits for influenza-like illness during the
1999-2000 and 2000-01 influenza seasons was generally simi-
lar to that reported during the two prior seasons. The number
of weeks that this proportion exceeded baseline were 21 for the
1997-98 and 1998-99 influenza seasons and 17 for the 1999-
2000 and 2000-01 seasons. 
Comparing the Influenza Rapid Test with Culture 
A two-by-two table comparing the results of the FLU OIA
test and culture results obtained during the 2000-01 influenza
season is presented (Figure). In our setting, the positive predic-
tive value of the FLU OIA was 51%, and the negative predic-
tive value was 84%.
Conclusion
This is the first evaluation of the effects of integrating rapid
testing for influenza into public health surveillance. Surveil-
lance incorporating rapid tests greatly increased the number of
specimens submitted for viral culture and the number of influ-
enza isolates obtained. This finding is important because
enhancing our capacity to recover circulating influenza virus
isolates is the first step in establishing a robust virologic sur-
veillance system designed to detect novel viral strains with
pandemic potential. 
Table 1. Number of influenza cultures submitted, isolates obtained,
sub-typed and antigenically characterized, and the number of
providers participating in surveillance, compiled by influenza season,
Hawaii. 
Influenza season a
Number of:  1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000b 2000-01b
Cultures 
submitted 306 396 1112 2169
Influenza 
isolates  73 44 137 491
Influenza A 
isolates             73 35 136 202
 (Number 
subtyped) (10) (20) (0) (159)
Influenza B 
isolates 0 9 1 289
Providers 
submitting 
one or more 
cultures 25 34 196 327
a The influenza season was defined as the period beginning with week 40 of the first
year extending through week 20 of the next year, i.e. early-October though mid-May.
b Rapid tests incorporated into influenza surveillance during this season.  
Table 2. Number of influenza cultures performed at 37 World Health
Organization collaborating virology laboratories located throughout
the United States (excluding Hawaii), aggregated by region and
compiled by influenza seasona
Influenza season % Change 
from 1998-
99 to 1999-
2000 1997-98 1998-99
1999-
2000
Hawaii 306 396 1,112 181%
Regional U.S. totals
East South Central 190 339 424 25%
West North Central 7,225 7,218 8,663 20%
Mountain 4,456 5,531 6,471 17%
Mid-Atlantic 3,421 3,785 4,191 11%
Pacific (excl. 
Hawaii) 2,288 3,214 3,353 4%
South Atlantic 8,510 8,637 8,368 3%
West South Central 1,040 2,291 2,173 5%
New England 1,308 1,720 1,555 10%
East North Central 3,917 4,041 3,572 12%
Total for laboratories 
outside Hawaii  32,355 36,776 38,770 5%
a Data for the 2000-01 season were not yet available at the time this report was
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Although physicians were permitted to send specimens
directly to HDOH for viral culture, most of the influenza cul-
ture specimens submitted during the 1999-2000 and 2000-01
seasons were collected concurrently with a specimen for rapid
testing. The fact that so few culture specimens were collected
without a companion specimen for rapid testing implies that
many physicians felt there was value to having both a culture
and rapid test result, or alternatively, that the rapid test served
as an incentive to obtain a culture. 
The dramatic increase in the number of physicians who
participated in the enhanced influenza surveillance project as
compared to standard virologic surveillance suggests that the
availability of the rapid test may have appealed to a larger
cohort of clinicians. The involvement of a greater number of
physicians is a promising development because public health
officials may ultimately be able to obtain a more extensive and
representative sample of circulating influenza isolates by
broadening the pool of patients sampled. 
This assessment is limited in that it lacks a control group
consisting of physicians and laboratories that did not have
access to the free rapid influenza tests for comparison once the
enhanced virologic influenza project was initiated, beginning
with the 1999-2000 influenza season. Instead, we compared
the number of specimens received during the 1999-2000 and
2000-01 influenza seasons to the number received in the two
prior seasons. Because the severity of annual influenza seasons
can vary greatly from year to year, it could be argued that the
increased number of specimens submitted during the latter sea-
sons was secondary to increased numbers of influenza-like ill-
nesses during those seasons. Several sources of information
suggest this was not the case, however. First, influenza-like ill-
ness surveillance in Hawaii over the 4-year period does not
suggest that influenza activity was markedly increased during
the last two seasons. Second, the number of influenza cultures
performed at laboratories on the mainland during the 1999-
2000 season did not increase over the previous season to the
extent observed in Hawaii. Third, CDC’s published assessment
of the 1999-2000 influenza season was that the “season’s activ-
ity was similar to the previous two” and influenza activity dur-
ing the 2000-01 season was assessed as “moderate and lower
than the previous three seasons” (12,13).
During the first season in which rapid tests were intro-
duced, HDOH was unprepared for the increased numbers of
submissions for influenza culture. HPHVL reported that the
high volume of specimens received during the peak period
placed an unexpected strain on virology section’s resources
and that shortages in host cells, incubator space, and laboratory
supplies resulted in a delay of several weeks for processing
approximately 100 specimens (S. Naka, pers. comm.). The
increased workload from processing specimens at HPHVL
greatly reduced the laboratory’s resources for subtyping the
influenza A isolates obtained that season. While recovering
isolates is a critical first step in developing our capacity for
influenza surveillance, to truly improve pandemic prepared-
ness any increases in virus isolation must be coupled with
expanded subtyping of influenza A isolates. Recognizing this,
and with the experience gained from the prior year, adjust-
ments in staffing and procurement permitted 79% of the influ-
enza A isolates to be subtyped during the 2000-01 season. 
Because of the difficulties encountered in processing speci-
mens during the 1999-2000 influenza season, we limited our
assessment of the influenza rapid test as compared to culture to
specimens received in the 2000-01 season. This project was
Figure. Comparison of FLU OIA and viral culture results, 2000-01 influ-
enza season, Hawaii.
Table 3. The number and proportion of visits for influenza-like illness (ILI) reported from Hawaii physicians participating in the U.S. Influenza
Sentinel Physician Surveillance Network, by influenza season 
Influenza season
Number of 
participating 
physicians
Number of 
visits for ILI 
a
Total number of 
visits
Overall % of 
visits for ILI  
Number of weeks 
proportion of visits for 
ILI exceeded baseline b
Highest weekly 
proportion of visits 
for ILI 
1997-98 11 805 25,085 3.2% 13 10%
1998-99 11 728 31,308 2.3% 8 6%
1999-2000 7 272 14,831 1.8% 6 8%
2000-01c 15 819 30,722 2.7% 11 6%
a ILI is defined as a fever of > 37.8o C accompanied by a cough or sore throat. 
b ILI baseline is defined as < 3% (see reference 10).
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not designed as an evaluation of the rapid influenza test: We
did not control for patient selection, specimen collection, or
laboratory technique. Therefore, the findings from this field
evaluation may not represent the rapid test’s performance in
other settings. Other assessments on the performance of influ-
enza rapid tests are available (5,7,14).
Finding that isolates recovered during the influenza season
increased when we integrated influenza rapid testing into our
surveillance system should help allay concerns that adopting
these tests will undermine virologic surveillance. If rapid influ-
enza tests become an established component of clinical man-
agement, it will be difficult to convince clinicians to collect
culture specimens in lieu of performing rapid tests (7,15). Col-
lection of a second specimen for culture confirmation, on the
other hand, may be seen as clinically appropriate. Therefore,
public health agencies may ultimately benefit from incorporat-
ing rapid diagnostic tests into influenza surveillance programs.
None of the commercial laboratories that participated in
this project were independently offering rapid influenza testing
before the 1999-2000 season. Through this initiative, each of
the laboratories gained a level of proficiency in performing the
rapid influenza test, and physicians became familiar with
ordering the test. Once rapid influenza testing becomes estab-
lished in laboratory and clinical practice, the question of
whether providers will continue to opt for a rapid test and viral
culture provided by a public health agency, or simply order a
rapid test from a private laboratory at the patient’s expense, is
still unanswered. 
Although Hawaii’s Enhanced Influenza Virologic Surveil-
lance program is a good model of a public-private partnership
(16), we have one potential concern about the impact of using
rapid influenza tests on public health surveillance. To date, at
least two private influenza surveillance systems using rapid
tests have been established–one by a manufacturer of a rapid
test kit and the other by a pharmaceutical company that pro-
duces an anti-influenza medication (17,18). Large private dis-
ease surveillance systems are relatively new to medicine.
Because the chief concern of these proprietary systems is likely
to be increasing sales of a product, it is not clear what role they
will play in protecting the public health. If private surveillance
systems compete with public agencies for physician participa-
tion, they may adversely affect virologic influenza surveil-
lance.
In summary, our findings demonstrate that rapid influenza
tests can be successfully integrated into public health surveil-
lance efforts, resulting in a larger number of influenza isolates
being available for subtyping and antigenic characterization.
This enhanced influenza surveillance effort was accomplished
through mutually beneficial public-private partnerships with
commercial laboratories that routinely provide service to com-
munity physicians and their patients. Preparing for the next
influenza pandemic compels public health agencies to work
with physicians to expand our capacity for influenza surveil-
lance. As the available data indicate that recent influenza pan-
demic strains have originated in Asia, vigilant virologic
surveillance is especially important for Hawaii (19). Should an
anomalous influenza strain emerge from Asia again in the
future, our state’s unique geographic location and visitor pro-
file make it likely that our population will be among the first in
the United States to encounter this new pathogen. 
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